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Notional defined contribution pension schemes: Why does only Sweden distribute 
the survivor dividend? 
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of the survivor dividend in notional defined 
contribution (NDC) pension schemes. At present this feature can only be found in the 
Swedish defined contribution (DC) scheme. We develop a model that endorses the idea that 
the survivor dividend has a strong basis for enabling the NDC scheme to achieve financial 
equilibrium and that not including the dividend is a non-transparent way of compensating 
for increases in longevity and/or legacy costs from old pension systems. We also find that 
the average effect of the dividend remains unchanged for any constant annual rate of 
population growth, that contributors who reach retirement age always get a higher return 
than the scheme does, and that population growth enables cohorts with more years of 
contributions to benefit to a greater extent from the dividend effect. 
  
 
JEL: E62, H55, J26, M41. 
 
KEYWORDS: Internal Rate of Return, Financial Equilibrium, Longevity Risk, Pay-As-You-
Go, Public Pensions, Retirement, Transparency. 
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Notional defined contribution pension schemes: Why does only Sweden distribute 
the survivor dividend? 
1. Introduction. 
The introduction of what are known as notional (or non-financial) defined contribution 
pension accounts (NDCs) as a component of modern multi-pillar pension systems in some 
countries has been one of the main innovations of the last two decades as regards pension 
reform. They can be found in Italy (1995), Kyrgyzstan (1997), Latvia (1996), Poland (1999), 
Sweden (1999), Brazil1 (1999) and Mongolia (2000). Other countries such as Germany, 
Austria, France, Finland, Portugal and Norway have incorporated some sort of adjustment 
mechanism that can also be found in NDCs to help calculate or index the initial retirement 
pension. According to Holzmann et al (2012), more countries including Egypt, China and 
Greece are seriously considering the introduction of NDCs2. 
A notional defined contribution scheme is a pay-as-you-go scheme (PAYG) that deliberately 
mimics a financial defined contribution scheme (FDC) by paying an income stream whose 
present value over a person’s expected remaining lifetime equals the accumulated capital at 
retirement.   
The practical application of NDCs first came about in the early 1990s, and since the mid-
1990s they have been introduced in a number of countries. For Holzmann & Palmer (2012), 
NDC schemes work well from a practical point of view, as shown by the experiences of Italy, 
Latvia, Poland and Sweden, but they could be made to work even better.  
This paper deals specifically with the so-called survivor dividend (also known as inheritance 
gains), which is distributed in the saving phase on a birth cohort basis from the account 
balances of participants who do not survive to retirement in NDC pension schemes3. This 
feature can currently only be found in the Swedish DC scheme. 
According to Pensionsmyndigheten (2013), the Swedish pension scheme aims to redistribute 
resources from individuals with shorter-than-average life spans to those who live longer 
during the pay-out (or decumulation) phase. This arrangement works in exactly the same way 
as in DC-funded pillars when the beneficiary chooses the pay-out option of receiving the 
retirement benefit as a life annuity. NDC schemes do not allow phased withdrawals4, where 
the retirement savings of deceased beneficiaries are distributed to their inheritors. Unlike 
with the DC-funded pillar, in the pay-in phase the pension balances of deceased persons are 
redistributed each year to surviving insured persons in the same birth cohort. This 
entitlement is completely different from the inheritance options in DC-funded pillars, where 
the accumulated capital in the individual account is distributed to inheritors and/or 
transformed into a survivor benefit. 
Very little attention has been paid to the subject of the survivor dividend in the economic 
literature. Not even the report published by the Swedish authorities, Pensionsmyndigheten 
(2013), explains in depth its actuarial foundation and the effect it has on the scheme's 
financial equilibrium. As far as we know, the paper by Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2014) is 
the only one that has shed any light on whether it would be justified to include the survivor 
dividend when calculating affiliate pension balances in an NDC framework with no 
population changes. It concludes that including the survivor dividend in the calculation of 
the initial pension is by no means irrelevant because the pension could rise by up to 21.84% 
depending on the mortality scenario used. 
The aim of this paper is to carry out an in-depth analysis of the role of the survivor dividend 
in NDC schemes. With this aim in mind, we first extend the model developed by Boado-
Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2014). Second, we show that contributors who reach retirement age 
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always get a higher return than the scheme does, and that population growth enables cohorts 
with more years of contributions to benefit to a greater extent from the dividend effect. The 
results reached in the numerical example we present endorse the fact that the model really 
works.  
Following this brief introduction, in Section 2 we present the model. Its main novelties are 
the introduction of changes in the growth of the active population and the possibility of 
exploring the effect of the survivor dividend on the relationship between the individual’s 
internal rate of return (IRR) for contributors and the scheme’s IRR. In Section 3 we present 
a complex example representative of a generic NDC scheme. Specifically, we provide a 
numerical illustration of the effects of the survivor dividend on the scheme's financial 
equilibrium when the economically active population is not constant, plus the impact of the 
survivor dividend on the individual’s IRR for contributors who reach retirement age. The 
paper ends with the conclusions, possible directions for future research and an appendix 
with some proofs of the formulas used in Section 2. 
2. The Model. 
In this section we extend the actuarial overlapping generations model (OLG) developed by 
Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2014) based on those first put forward by Settergren & Mikula 
(2005), Boado-Penas et al. (2008) and Vidal-Meliá & Boado-Penas (2013). These papers were 
to some extent inspired by the accounting framework for organizing, summarizing and 
interpreting data on transfer systems and the life cycle developed in Lee (1994), Willis (1988) 
and Arthur & McNicoll (1978). 
As we will see later, the main extensions to this model are the introduction of changes in the 
economically active population, the possibility of exploring the effect of the survivor 
dividend on the relationship between the individual’s IRR for contributors who reach 
retirement age and the scheme’s IRR. 
The model’s main features and assumptions are: 
 The defined contribution rate credited to the individual, aθ , is fixed over time. 
 The initial pension depends on the value of the accumulated notional account, the 
expected mortality of the cohort in the year the contributor reaches retirement, and 
a future indexation rate, λ, i.e. pensions in payment increase or decrease at an annual 
rate of λ. 
 The accumulated capital in the notional account reflects each participant's individual 
contributions and the fictitious returns these contributions generate over the course 
of the participant’s working life, plus the inheritance capital. 
 The account balances of participants who do not survive to retirement are distributed 
as inheritance capital to the accounts of surviving participants on a birth cohort basis. 
 The scheme does not provide a minimum pension. 
 Contributions and benefits are payable yearly in advance. 
 Participants’ lives last (w-1-xe) periods, where (w-1) is the highest age to which it is 
possible to survive and xe is the earliest age of entry into the pension scheme. 
 The age giving entitlement to retirement pension, xe+A, is fixed. 
 The individual contribution base grows at an annual rate of g.  
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 The economically active population increases or decreases over time at an annual rate 
of γ, affecting all groups of contributors equally. 
 The scheme's income from contributions (wage bill) also grows (decreases) at rate G 
= (1+g)(1+γ)-1. 
 When the pension scheme reaches a mature state t = w-1-xe-A years from inception, 
A generations of contributors and (w-(xe+A)) generations of pensioners coexist at 
each moment in time.  
The demographic-financial structure at any moment t is given by:  
1. Age: 
  
  
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ee
rs' agesContributo
eeee ... w-,.........AA, xx, A......x, ........,  x,  xx 11121              1. 
2. Number of contributors by age at time t: 
γ)(NN, ....., γ)(NN, γ)(NN t-e et-eet-e e , t)A(x ), A(x), (x, t)(x, t)(x ), (x    111 111 1 111111  2. 
where pNN k), (x x)k, (x e ee   11 , with pk xe  being the probability that an individual aged xe will 
be alive at age xe+k. 
3. Average wage by age at time t: 
g)(yy ,......, g)(y y, g)(y y t-
ee
t-
ee
t-
ee ), A(x, t)A(x), (x, t)(x), (x, t)(x
  111 111 1111111
3. 
This demographic structure means that the age-wage structure (contribution bases) only 
undergoes proportional changes. The slope of the age-wage structure is constant.  
After the main assumptions have been detailed, for the sake of clarity this section will be 
divided into three subsections: a description of the pension scheme in the mature state, the 
definition and calculation of the survivor dividend, and the effect of the survivor dividend 
on the scheme's financial equilibrium. 
2.1. Description of the pension scheme in the mature state.  
The main implications of the NDC scheme’s being in a mature state are (1) it pays full 
benefits to all generations of retirement pensioners, (2) the dependency ratio5, 
tdr , stabilizes, 
and (3) the financial ratio, tfr , is constant due to the fact that the average pension and the 
average contribution base evolve at the rate of variation in wages. Hence the total 
contribution rate ( tθ ) that ensures equality between contribution revenue and pension 
expenditure is constant over time, and the scheme's income from contributions is equivalent 
to the present actuarial value of the pensions awarded in that year.   
The initial average pension in year t for those individuals who reach retirement age xe+A, 
A, t)e(x
P  , can be calculated as: 
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 where: 
A, t)(xeN  : Number of contributors aged xe+A, whereas N A, c,t)(x e   is the number of 
contributors aged xe+A who have been contributing for the last c years. Therefore

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1 : Present value at age xe+A of 1 monetary unit of a lifetime 
pension payable in advance and indexed at rate , with a technical interest rate equal to G. 
This is also called the annuity factor or actuarial divisor, with pk x Ae  being the probability 
that an individual aged xe+A will be alive at age xe+A +k.  
K acT A,t)(xe : Total accumulated notional capital at time t for all individuals who reach age xe+A. 
Therefore A, c, t)(x
A
c
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A,t)(x eee
NKK  

1
, where 
ac
A, c,t)(x eK  represents the accumulated 
notional capital at age xe+A for one individual who has been contributing for the last c years.
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

  : Average accumulated notional capital at time t for one individual aged 
xe+A. 
Henceforth F will be used to denote 




G1
1   throughout this paper. 
With population growth of 0γ , once the individual joins the labour market they will 
continue working nonstop until retirement age. The only exit from the labour market in this 
model is early death. Therefore there are A different contribution pathways that will 
determine A different pensions, as contributors might be working for 1 year, 2 years…, A-
1 years.  
Contributions of individuals who die before reaching retirement age are included in the 
notional capital. Consequently, in the case of 0γ , P A, c,t)(x e   is the initial pension at 
ordinary retirement age for individuals who entered the labour market at age xe+A-c, i.e. for 
one individual who has been contributing for the last c years, whereas A, t)e(xP   is the average 
pension for individuals who retire at the ordinary retirement age, this being a weighted 
average pension of the A different pensions once settled.  
As formula [4.] shows, in line with the definition of an NDC scheme being one that 
deliberately mimics an FDC scheme, the process for calculating the initial amount of the 
retirement pension is similar to the one used for calculating the future instalments of a 
deferred lifetime annuity, a type of annuity contract where payments are not scheduled to 
begin until a future date, in this case the age of retirement.  
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The balanced contribution rate, tθ , makes spending on pensions equal to the revenue from 
contributions, and hence: 
  
  
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Therefore once the mature state is reached, the macro contribution rate, tθ , is constant from 
an actuarial point of view and can be expressed as the product of the dependency ratio and 
the financial ratio: 
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                         6. 
2.2. Definition and determination of the survivor dividend when the economically 
active population increases. 
As in the Swedish NDC scheme, we follow the principle that each monetary unit contributed 
is paid out in the form of a retirement or old-age benefit, but not necessarily to the individual 
who made the contributions. An accumulated survivor dividend is included for any individual 
who reaches retirement age. The account balances of participants who do not survive to 
retirement are distributed as inheritance capital to the accounts of survivors on a birth cohort 
basis6.  
In this model, the amount of the survivor dividend can mainly be quantified using formulas 
[7.] and [8.] 
Formula [7.] shows the mathematical expression of the accumulated survivor dividend at 
retirement age at time t for an individual who belongs to the initial group (that entered the 
scheme at age xe) and has therefore contributed since entering the pension scheme: 
kA
A-
k
t)kAk,(x
K
kA
A
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t)kAk,(xa
ac
A, A, t)(x
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A, A, t)(x G)(DG)(yθKD e
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  

11
1
1
1
0   
         7. 
where t)kAk,(xeD   is the dividend distributed at time t-A+k for individuals aged xe+k. 
As mentioned above, the accumulated survivor dividend at a specific age is the portion of 
the credited account balances of participants resulting from the distribution, on a birth 
cohort basis, of the account balances of participants who do not survive to retirement. In 
other words it is the difference between credited capital Kac A, A, t)(xe , which includes 
contributions and indexation on contributions for members from the same cohort who died, 
and individual credited notional capital K i A, A, t)(xe  . 
When the economically active population grows over time (see Section 2.1.), there are A 
different contribution pathways that will determine A different contribution profiles. 
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Formula [7.] therefore needs to be modified to account for the different profiles. Formula 
[8.] quantifies the average accumulated dividend at age xe+A, taking into account the 
different A contribution profiles:  


   
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In short, when the active population increases, the accumulated dividend for the individual 
who reaches retirement age depends on the mortality rates by age, the rate of population 
growth and the number of years contributed.  
2.3. The effect of the survivor dividend on the scheme's financial equilibrium. 
The survivor dividend plays a crucial role in the scheme's financial equilibrium and - as shown 
in Appendix 1 - it is easy to prove the equivalence between the macro (balanced) contribution 
rate, tθ , and the credited individual contribution rate, aθ , in the model.  
If the amount of the pension is determined from the individual notional capital without 
considering the survivor dividend, then the new balanced contribution rate, θ *t , and the 
credited individual contribution rate, aθ , are different because the retirement benefits are 
strictly lower than they should be (as the survivor dividend is not distributed among the 
survivors).  
The relation between both contribution rates can be expressed using the so-called dividend 
effect, as shown in formula [9.]: 
P
Pθ K
D θ K
K  θθ i
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A, t)(x*
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
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
 0 effect  Dividend
1                     9. 
where K i A,t)(xe  is the average individual accumulated notional capital at time t for individuals 
aged xe+A, without taking into account the survivor dividend, and i
A, t)e(x
P   is the average 
pension of an individual who retires at the ordinary age at t, again without considering the 
dividend. 
The dividend effect measures either the increase in the initial retirement pension after 
inclusion of the survivor dividend or the decrease in the balanced contribution rate if the 
dividend is not included in the pension calculation. Therefore θθ *ta     because the scheme 
saved money by not including the survivor dividend.  
If θθ at   were contributed instead of θ*t , the pension scheme would continuously 
accumulate financial reserves because ignoring the survivor dividend produces savings when 
longevity is constant over time. In practice these reserves could finance the increase in 
spending on pensions resulting from increases in longevity and/or legacy costs from old 
pension systems. Indeed, in Poland and Latvia these revenues provide funds for other social 
insurance commitments that have no specific source of funding. Both countries decided to 
introduce funded components and, as a result, the revenue for the pay-as-you-go pillars was 
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reduced due to contributions being transferred to funded accounts. Hence the inheritance 
gains help to cover the double payment burden. 
In year t, assuming constant longevity, the amount of the scheme’s surplus, St, is easy to 
quantify because it is connected to the survivor dividend, specifically to the average 
accumulated dividend: 
   D
)KK( NNy)θθ(
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eeeee
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 1
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10. 
The cost of longevity measured as the increase in life expectancy at retirement age, AxeΔe  , 
that could be financed if the dividend were not distributed, in the simplest case where Gλ 
, can be quantified following the reasoning presented in Appendix 1. 
3. Numerical example.  
This section presents a numerical example to illustrate the important role played by the 
survivor dividend in the NDC framework. To do this we basically use the closed-form 
expressions developed in Section 2.   
Individuals are assumed to join the labour market at age 16 (xe,) onwards and contribute 16% 
(θ a ) of their contribution base until they reach 65 (xe+A). The individual contribution bases 
grow at an annual accumulative rate (g) of 1.6%, while the retirement pension, once settled, 
is constant in real terms ( 0λ ). 
For the purposes of comparison, the mortality tables7 used are those for Poland in 2009 (PL), 
Latvia in 2010 (LT) and Sweden (SW) in 20118.  
3.1. Baseline case: zero population growth 
In the case of zero population growth, all individuals enter the labour market at age 16 and 
work continuously until retiring at age 65. The amount of pension payable to individuals aged 
65 is determined, after 49 contribution years, according to the formulas shown in the 
previous section. Under this scenario the balanced contribution rate ( θ t ) is 16% and 
coincides with the credited contribution rate (θ a ).  
The first vertical axis of Figure 1 (see after Table 1 below) shows the numbers of contributors 
and pensioners by age depending on the mortality scenario (SW, PL or LT) in a mature state 
from a cross-sectional point of view. The second vertical axis represents the contribution 
base and pension structure under the three different mortality scenarios (SW-w&p, PL-w&p 
and LT-w&p). 
The main values making up the scheme's financial equilibrium under the three mortality 
tables are shown in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
It can be seen that the mortality pattern has a significant effect on the amount of the 
retirement pensions provided by the scheme. Under the mortality scenario with the highest 
life expectancy (Figure 1, SW, in blue), the actuarially fair pensions are much lower than those 
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under the other mortality scenarios (PL, in black, and LT, in grey). Consequently under the 
SW mortality scenario, the annuity divisor, λ Axea  , used to calculate the amount of the initial 
retirement pension is higher (17.23) than those under the other mortality scenarios (15.05 
and 14.39 for PL and LT respectively).  
Given that the initial assumptions are analogous for all three scenarios, mortality rates play a 
crucial role in achieving the scheme's financial equilibrium. As Table 1 shows for the SW 
scenario, the scheme’s dependency rate ( tdr ) is higher (38.86%) than for the other two 
scenarios (30.20% and 27.57% for PL and LT respectively), whereas the scheme’s financial 
rate ( tfr ) is lower (41.18% as against 52.98% and 58.04% for PL and LT respectively). These 
results come naturally from formula [6.]. If there is a defined contribution rate, tθ , fixed over 
time, and if the dependency ratio is determined by the mortality scenario, then the financial 
ratio has to be adapted accordingly.  
For the SW scenario, the amount of the pension once settled at retirement age, A, t)(xeβ  , 
amounts to 68.77% of the average salary. The impact of the dividend effect, Det , on the 
initial pension is not very significant as it would only rise by 7.39% after the balances of 
participants who do not survive to retirement are distributed. For the same scenario, if the 
survivor dividend were not included in the calculation of the initial retirement pension, a 
discrepancy would arise between the credited contribution rate equal to 16%, θ t , and the 
rate necessary to finance the pension, θ *t , in this case 14.90%. As can be seen in formula 
[9.], the direct link between both rates is the dividend effect 1 )( θθDe *ttt .  
The impact of the dividend effect, Det , on the initial pension is not insignificant for the other 
two scenarios, with the pension rising by 18.32% using the Polish mortality tables (PL) and 
23.12% using the Latvian tables (LT). As a result, the replacement rates reached are also 
higher due to inclusion of the dividend. There is a direct relation between the dividend effect 
and the replacement rates. Indeed, with the variables provided in Table 1, it is easy to see 
that 1)( 


β
β
De i
A, t)(x
A, t)(x
t
e
e . 
As seen in Table 1, if the survivor dividend were not included in the calculation of the initial 
retirement pension, the pension scheme could handle an unexpected increase in life 
expectancy at retirement age ( AxeΔe  ) of between 1.48 and 3.76 years, depending on the 
scenario, before exhausting the accumulated surplus. Again, the dividend effect can be used 
to explain the increase in life expectancy at retirement needed to neutralize the lack of 
dividend. Given this, it is not difficult to check in Table 1 that 
Ax
Ax
t
e
e
e
Δe
De

  
3.2. Population changes 
The growth in population means that the retirees’ generation can be split into A different 
cohorts, whose common factor is the number of years contributed since joining the labour 
market. This section explores two additional assumptions about the rate of population 
growth: (1) that the number of contributors of all ages grows at an annual rate of γ =0.01 
over time (henceforth PL+), and (2) that the number of contributors of all ages decreases by 
an annual rate of γ =-0.01 (henceforth PL-). The Polish mortality scenario (referred to in 
the previous section as PL) is taken as a reference when analysing the effect of population 
changes, whether increases or decreases, because its survivor dividend has an average effect 
on the results, falling between the other two scenarios.  
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The results presented in the previous sub-section are recalculated taking into account the 
effect of population changes under the two additional assumptions described above. Figure 
2 is included later in this sub-section for a better understanding of what happens when the 
economically active population grows. In addition, the relationship between the IRR for 
contributors by years of contributions and the IRR for the scheme itself is studied under the 
population growth scenario. The main results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. 
The main values making up the scheme's financial equilibrium under the three population 
scenarios are shown in Table 2.   
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
What really draws the attention is that the ratio between the numbers of contributors and 
pensioners, the ratio between the average salary and pension, and the effect of the survivor 
dividend remain unchanged when the economically active population is not constant over 
time. However, the explanation is obvious. Given that the contribution rate is the same under 
the three population scenarios, the ratio between the number of pensioners and the number 
of contributors (drt) must also be the same because it depends on the mortality scenario and, 
according to equation [11.] in Appendix 1, the ratio stabilizes because both groups evolve 
(increase or decrease) at exactly the same rate as population growth ( γ). Therefore, according 
to equation [6.], the scheme's average replacement rate (frt) has to be the same for all three 
population scenarios. 
The rate of population growth has a direct effect on the sustainable scheme’s rate of return 
(G), which in the NDC framework largely determines the amount of the initial retirement 
benefit provided by the schemes. Consequently, the higher the population growth, the higher 
the amount of accumulated notional capital, which implies a higher amount of initial pension. 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
The scheme's sustainability derives from an adjustment to the average initial pension, directly 
linked to the annuity factor, λ Axea  , and the accumulated notional capital reached at retirement 
age. With an annual increase in population of γ =0.01 and for a given amount of credited 
notional capital at retirement age, the initial amount of the pension awarded will be higher 
than with a decrease in population of 1% ( γ =-0.01) or constant population growth of 0% (
γ  =0). This is because the annuity divisor used is lower (13.73 as against 16.59 for the 
decrease in population and 15.05 for constant population respectively). The higher the value 
of G, the lower the value of the annuity divisor. 
In our example, generation members who retire at age 65 could come from any of 49 
different cohorts depending on the number of years contributed. This determines 49 (A) 
different amounts of pension that set the generation’s average initial pension, linked to the 
average number of years contributed by those who reach retirement age. Therefore growth 
in the economically active population brings about changes in the average years contributed 
(AYC), as shown in Table 2. Under the assumption that the number of contributors of all 
ages grows at an annual rate of γ =0.01 over time, the AYC is 38.97 as opposed to 49 for γ 
=0 or γ =-0.01, where all the contributors who reach retirement age started working at the 
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entry age of 16, i.e. A years ago. It can be said that the value assigned to γ  has an inverse 
influence on the AYC for the generation that retires at time t. 
In spite of the growth in population that brings about a reduction in the AYC (see Table 2), 
the average replacement rate, A, t)(xeβ  , reached for PL+ is even higher (95.07%) than in the 
other two cases (78.68% and 86.75% for PL- and PL respectively). 
The data provided in Table 2 clearly show us that the amount of the pension with an equal 
number of years of contributions for the case of positive population growth is much higher 
than for the case of stable population and higher than for a decrease in population. This is 
to be expected given that the scheme’s sustainable return with population growth is higher. 
Another underlying issue is whether or not the variation in population has an influence on 
the dividend effect. According to the data shown in Table 2, the dividend effect remains 
constant for any value of γ , but we need to study what happens when the population 
increases. In the case of population growth there is a vector of pensions - A different 
pensions - so it is important to find out whether the impact of the dividend remains constant 
for cohorts belonging to the same generation of retirees when there are changes in the rate 
of population growth. 
The answer can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the dividend effect for each of the A 
cohorts that make up the retirees’ generation under the assumption that the population grows 
annually at a constant rate of 0.01, 0.02 or 0.04. For the values of γ assumed, the AYCs are 
38.97, 31.67 and 22.20 respectively, given that γ has an inverse influence on the AYC for the 
generation that retires at time t. 
Figure 2 shows that, for example, under the assumption that the population grows annually 
at a constant rate of 0.01 (represented by the solid black line), those contributors who reach 
retirement age having started working at the earliest age possible, i.e. age 16, benefit from a 
dividend effect of 19.07%. This is higher than the dividend effect with zero population 
growth (18.32%) but lower than for the scenarios in which the population grows annually at 
a constant rate of 2% or 4%, represented by the solid grey and blue lines respectively. Under 
the scenario with the highest population growth, the dividend effect for contributors who 
started working at the earliest age reaches 20.99%, whereas for the intermediate assumption 
it is 19.77%. And it is not only contributors with 49 contributed years that obtain a higher 
than average dividend effect; many other contributor cohorts with fewer years of 
contributions also obtain a higher survivor dividend. For example, as shown in Figure 2 
under the scenario with the highest population growth, the dividend effect for those cohorts 
with more than 33 years of contributions is higher than the average, whereas for those 
cohorts with fewer than 33 contributed years it is lower. 
Under the other two population scenarios, the number of years contributed are 38 and 42 
for γ=0.02 and γ=0.01 respectively. 
Population growth therefore enables cohorts with more years of contributions to benefit to 
a greater extent from the dividend effect. The more the number of contributors grows, the 
larger the pension for cohorts with more years of contributions compared to what it would 
have been without including the survivor dividend. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the 
average effect of the dividend remains constant for any value of γ . 
-The contributors’ IRR and its relation to the scheme’s IRR (G). 
To provide a numerical illustration, we will look at the relationship between the contributors’ 
IRR and that for the scheme itself under the population growth scenario.  
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Generally speaking, the contributors’ IRR - with or without the survivor dividend - depends 
on age of entry to the labour market and the time the calculation is done (at age of entry, at 
retirement age, s years after entering the labour market, etc.). As we will see later, this is 
because the age reached by the contributor is very important when computing the IRR. The 
impact of these two conditioning factors underlying the results of the contributors’ IRR are 
explored in Figures 3 and 4.  
For the three mortality scenarios (SW, solid blue line, PL, solid black line, and LT, solid grey 
line), Figure 3 presents the expected IRR A, A-K, t)(x e  for contributors who reach retirement 
age taking into account the survivor dividend and distinguishing by age of entry to the labour 
market, i.e. according to the number of years contributed.  
The figure also compares the cohort IRRs with the scheme’s IRR (G, broken black line), 
which is the same as the return that contributors would get if the survivor dividend were not 
included when calculating the initial retirement pension. As expected, the IRR decreases as 
the age of entry to the labour market increases because the contributors benefit less from the 
distribution of deceased persons’ contributions. It can also be observed that, depending on 
the mortality scenario, the IRR varies between 3.41% for SW (the scenario with the lowest 
mortality rates) and 5.41% for LT (the scenario with the highest mortality rates) at a labour 
market entry age of 16. This difference between mortality scenarios tends to decrease as the 
age of entry to the labour market increases. If the individual joins the labour market at age 
56, the IRR varies between 2.97% for SW and 3.74% for LT.  
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
 
Hence the individuals’ IRR varies significantly depending on the number of contribution 
years for each cohort within the same generation, and contributors who reach retirement age 
always get a higher return than the scheme because their notional capital also includes 
contributions from affiliates who die before reaching retirement age.  
Figure 4 shows the results of the study set for cohorts of contributors who joined the labour 
market at the earliest age possible, i.e. 16 in our example, differentiating by age attained.  
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
The outcomes when the survivor dividend is taken into account, IRR(sd) s, t)(xe , are 
represented in Figure 4 as SW (solid blue line), PL (solid black line) and LT (solid grey line). 
It can be seen that the IRR increases with age, due to the fact that the survivors’ accumulated 
notional capital increases yearly as a result of the distribution of the dividend. 
The results when the survivor dividend is not taken into account are represented in Figure 4 
as SW* (broken blue line), PL* (broken black line) and LT* (broken grey line). A maximum 
return equal to G is only achieved by survivors who reach retirement age, and therefore the 
scheme permanently accumulates reserves if the dividend is not included when calculating 
the pension. 
The results shown in Figure 4 do not exactly match one of the stated properties for NDCs 
according to Palmer (2006): Property 1. At any time the present value of an individual’s lifetime benefit 
equals the individual’s account balance. For each participant and at all times, the amount in the account, K, 
is the present or expected value of his or her benefit. The value of the account is determined by the individual’s 
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own contributions and the system’s internal rate of return; and Diamond (2006): An NDC is supposed 
to provide benefits for different cohorts that have a present discounted value that equals the value of the account, 
using the internal rate of return (IRR) (of the system) for a discount rate. 
When they say the system’s internal rate of return or the internal rate of return (IRR) (of the system), 
both authors seem to be referring to what in this paper has been defined as G. Hence the 
property stated by Palmer (2006), IRR=G, is only fulfilled in two specific cases for the 
contribution cohort that joins the labour market at the earliest possible age.  
Case 1: When the IRR is computed at age of entry into the labour market under the 
assumption that the survivor dividend is taken into account to calculate the retirement 
benefit.   
Case 2: When the IRR is valued at retirement age under the assumption that the survivor 
dividend is not taken into account to calculate the retirement benefit.  
Both cases are identified in Figure 4 for contributors who entered the labour market at the 
earliest possible age. For all other cases, depending on whether or not the scheme takes the 
survivor dividend into account when calculating the retirement pension, the expected IRR 
for different contributors is (very) different from G, and this difference depends on the 
number of years expected to be contributed and the survival probabilities attributed to 
affiliates. 
4. Concluding comments and directions for future research. 
Among those countries in which NDC schemes have been introduced, only Sweden applies 
what is known as the survivor dividend. Surprisingly little attention has been given to this 
subject in the economic literature and not even the report published by the Swedish 
authorities explains in any depth why this survivor dividend is applied.  
As far as we are aware, the paper by Boado-Penas & Vidal-Meliá (2014) is the only one that 
has shed any light on whether it would be justified to include the survivor dividend when 
calculating affiliate pension balances in an NDC framework. In the present paper we have 
extended their model to account for changes in the economically active population, and the 
effect of the survivor dividend on the relationship between the individual’s IRR for 
contributors who reach retirement age and the scheme’s IRR. 
We find that when the active population changes, the model endorses the idea that the 
survivor dividend has a sound basis which enables the NDC scheme to achieve financial 
equilibrium. To put it another way, the paper demonstrates that the survivor dividend enables 
the balanced contribution rate applied to be the same as the individual credited rate. A similar 
outcome was reached by Palmer (2012) regarding the equivalence between these two 
contribution rates in an NDC framework, but without explicitly considering the effect of the 
survivor dividend.  
We also find that the average effect of the survivor dividend remains unchanged for any 
constant annual rate of population growth, that contributors who reach retirement age always 
get a higher return than the scheme does, and that population growth enables cohorts with 
more years of contributions to benefit to a greater extent from the dividend effect. The 
higher the number of contributors, the higher the pension for those cohorts with more years 
of contributions, compared to what they would have received without inclusion of the 
survivor dividend. 
On the practical side, it can be said that the numerical example developed in the paper is 
close to reality. It confirms that our model really works because the results make sense and 
provide us with some useful values regarding the magnitude of the dividend effect, the 
unexpected increase in life expectancy at retirement age that the NDC scheme could handle 
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if the survivor dividend were not included in the calculation of the initial retirement pension, 
and the contributors’ IRR computed according to a set of different scenarios.   
In short, this topic is particularly important for the design of pension reforms and therefore 
this research could have a considerable impact for those countries that are currently 
rethinking the structure of their public pension systems. Taking the survivor dividend 
explicitly into account increases the political attractiveness of the reform by providing higher 
initial retirement benefits. The issue of transparency is also important, because not including 
the dividend means that systems tend to accumulate financial resources (as in countries such 
as Poland, Italy and Latvia) as a non-transparent way to protect their systems against the 
longevity risk and/or to finance legacy costs from former pension arrangements. 
Finally, based on the model presented in this paper, a number of important directions for 
future research can be identified. 
First, the coverage of any unexpected increase in longevity in cases where the SD is not 
distributed could be explored further in order to evaluate whether the SD is a potential 
solution for covering longevity risk in NDCs. Increases in longevity can be reflected not only 
by an increase in life expectancy at retirement age but also by a decrease in mortality rates or 
an increase in survival probabilities. Probabilities, meanwhile, can be evaluated as being either 
constant over time or age-specific depending on the mortality model. 
The second direction would consist of evaluating the impact of introducing a minimum 
pension on the scheme's financial equilibrium. According to Holzmann & Palmer (2006), 
NDC schemes should be supplemented with a minimum income (pension) guarantee. For 
Barr & Diamond (2009), the purpose of pensions is to provide an adequate income stream 
when the individual is unable to work due to disability or retirement, so it would be a good 
idea to introduce a minimum pension in order to maintain a minimum standard of living. 
Third, it would be interesting to design a fully integrated NDC model with retirement and 
permanent disability. An NDC scheme is widely defined as a PAYG scheme that deliberately 
mimics an FDC scheme. In most countries with mandatory individual capitalization accounts 
(Reyes (2010)), disability insurance is fully integrated into the FDC scheme. At the same time, 
according to Autor & Duggan (2006), OECD (2010) and Burkhauser et al. (2013), disability 
insurance is a big challenge for policy makers today. Hence, given that NDC schemes have 
positive features that could help to improve the efficiency of disability insurance, it would be 
useful to develop a theoretical model that fully integrated the disability contingency into an 
NDC framework. The methodology developed by Ventura-Marco & Vidal-Meliá (2014) 
could be a reference for designing this integrated model. 
Finally, insurance innovation could be incorporated into the model, as proposed by 
Murtaugh et al (2001) and Brown & Warshawsky (2013) for funded systems, by integrating 
retirement and long-term care (LTC) annuities. The NDC framework could be useful for 
this purpose. This suggestion stems from the fact that LTC as a contributory contingency 
has been provided in the German contributory pension system (Rothgang (2010)) since the 
mid-1990s. Barr (2010) also gives sound reasons for extending social security to provide 
mandatory cover for LTC.    
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Appendix 1: Proofs of some formulas/equations included in Section 2. 
1. Financial and dependency ratios in the mature state. 
Once the mature state is reached, the ratio between the number of pensioners and the 
number of contributors - (drt) - stabilizes because both groups evolve (increase or decrease) 
exactly equal to rate γ : 
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Also, the system's average replacement rate, expressed by the financial ratio, is already 
constant due to the fact that the numerator and denominator evolve equally (at the rate of 
variation in wages): 
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2. Relationship between contribution rates. 
The relationship between the credited contribution rate and the balanced rate according to 
formulas [4] and [6] is: 
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Therefore it is easy to see that ta θθ  . 
The amount of the pension ignoring the survivor dividend is calculated as follows: 
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where i
A, t)e(x
P   is the average pension, without taking into account the survivor dividend, of 
an individual who retires at the ordinary age at t. It is a weighted average pension depending 
on the A different pensions that can be awarded.  
Then, 
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and substituting the expression for P i A, t)(xe , we get: 
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3.- The increase in life expectancy at retirement age, AxeΔe  , that could be financed 
if the dividend were not distributed. 
If the survivor dividend is included: 
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However, given the assumption that Gλ  , it can be shown that: 
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where Axee   is the curtate expectation of life for an individual aged xe+A, i.e. the expected 
number of complete years remaining for an individual aged xe+A to live. 
Hence formula [19] should necessarily be fulfilled to neutralize the survivor dividend: 
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where:  
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Therefore:  
     0  AxAxAx eee Δee'e                                           21. 
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with AxeΔe   being the increase in life expectancy at the ordinary retirement age, measured in 
years, that would neutralize the effect of the survivor dividend. 
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Table 1: NDC scheme with survivor dividend: some selected values. 
Description variable Notation PL LT SW 
Credited rate=balanced rate %( θθ ta  ) 16.00 16.00 16.00 
Balanced rate without SD % θ *t  13.52 13.00 14.90 
Dividend effect % De t  18.32 23.12 7.39 
Demographic ratio % tdr 30.20 27.57 38.86 
Financial ratio % tfr  52.98 58.04 41.18 
Annuity divisor λ
Axe
a   15.05 14.39 17.23 
Life expectancy 
Axe
e  (years) 17.10 16.24 19.99 
Change in life expectancy 
Axe
Δe  (years) 3.1323 3.7551 1.4782 
Replacement rate with SD % A, t)(x eβ  86.75 94.39 68.77 
Replacement rate without SD % β i A, t)(xe  73.32 76.66 64.04 
Retirement age xe+A (years) 16+49=65 65 65 
Base scenario with G=(1.016)(1.00)-1=0.016 
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Table 2: NDC system with survivor dividend and population changes: some selected values.
Description variables Notation PL+ PL- PL 
Balanced rate without SD %( θθ ta  ) 16.00 
Dividend effect % θ *t  13.52 
Credited rate=balanced rate % De t  18.32 
Demographic ratio % tdr 30.20 
Financial ratio % tfr  52.98 
Annuity divisor λ
Axe
a   13.73 16.59 15.05 
Replacement rate with SD % A, t)(xeβ   95.07 78.68 86.75 
Replacement rate without SD % β i A, t)(xe   80.35 66.50 73.32 
Average years contributed  AYC  38.97 49 49 
Sustainable scheme’s rate of return % G 2.616 0.584 1.60 
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Figure 1: Structure of contributors, pensioners, wages and pensions under different mortality tables.
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Figure 2: Dividend effect for PL with population growth by years of contributions. 
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Figure 3: Expected IRR A, A-K, t)(x e  taking into account the survivor dividend, with γ=0.01 and by 
age of entry to the labour market. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of  IRR s, t)(xe  by age attained, with γ=0.01, for contributors who joined the 
labour market at age 16. 
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1 In Brazil, the NDC reform was adopted only for the private sector. 
2 See, for example, Lindbeck & Persson (2003), Williamson (2004), Börsch-Supan (2006), Holzmann & Palmer 
(2006), Vidal-Meliá et al (2006), Auerbach & Lee (2009), Vidal-Meliá et al (2010), Whitehouse (2010), Auerbach 
& Lee (2011), Chłoń-Domińczak et al (2012) and Holzmann et al (2012).  
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3 It is important not to confuse the concept of the survivor dividend (which mainly depends on mortality rates 
at specific ages) with the so-called “demographic dividend”, Ross (2004), which is linked to fertility dynamics.  
4 See Kritzer et al (2011). One possible way of designing programmed or phased withdrawal is when the affiliate 
receives a pension charged on the balance of their individual capitalization account which, by remaining under 
the responsibility and management of the administrator, allows the retiree to benefit from the return on the 
fund. The pension is fixed for periods of one year and the amount is calculated by taking into account the 
balance of the individual account, the technical rate of interest defined by law and the life expectancy of the 
worker and their family according to legal mortality tables. 
5 In this model the terms dependency ratio, old-age ratio and demographic ratio are used as synonyms given 
that everybody participates in the labour market.  
6 A contributor can reach retirement age as active or disabled. In the case of Sweden, the current regulations 
on disability pension are closely linked to the old-age pension system. According to Chłoń-Domińczak et al 
(2012), the Swedish model for retirement pension rights for persons receiving disability benefits is to impute 
and pay contributions for insured periods of disability into the retirement contingency. These payments, made 
annually from general tax revenues, are entered on the country’s accounts as a cost for the disability system and 
are part of the transfer from state revenues to the NDC pension fund. Disability benefits are converted into 
retirement benefits at age 65. 
7 Only observed mortality rates are used and not the population structure by ages.  
8 Years with the latest information available according to the Human Mortality Database 
(http://www.mortality.org/). Date accessed 10-05-2013. 
